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Abstract
The Logic of Proofs realizes the modalities from traditional modal logics with proof polynomials, so an expressionF becomes
t : F where t is a proof polynomial representing a proof of or evidence for F . The pioneering work on explicating the modal logic
S4 is due to S. Artemov and was extended to several subsystems by V. Brezhnev. In 2000, R. Kuznets presented a Π p2 algorithm
for deducibility in these logics; in the present paper we will show that the deducibility problem is Π p2 -complete. (The analogous
problem for traditional modal logics is PSPACE-complete.) Both Kuznets’s work and the present results make assumptions on the
values of proof constants.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In a series of papers beginning in 1992, Sergei Artemov developed the Logic of Proofs (LP), a realization of the
modal logic S4 in which the modality  (often interpreted as provability) is replaced with explicit terms representing
proofs. (See, for example, [1–3], and [4].) LP and its arithmetic interpretation provide answers to questions about the
intended semantics of intuitionistic logic and S4 asked by Go¨del [8,9] and provide a unified semantics for modality
and the typed lambda-calculus. More recently, LP has found application as a paradigm for the logic of knowledge.
Evidence-based knowledge is a constructive version of common knowledge, making problems involving the notion of
common knowledge amenable to automated proof search and verification [5].
Mkrtychev [14] showed the decidability of LP , and his algorithm for satisfiability was adapted and shown to
be in Σ p2 by Kuznets [11]. As the satisfiability problem for classical S4 is PSPACE-complete [13], LP has a clear
advantage.
In this paper, we will show that deciding derivability in several significant subsystems of LP is Π p2 -hard by
encoding QBF-2 as a formula of LP which can be derived only if the quantified boolean formula is true. This
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will show derivability in each of these subsystems of LP to be Π p2 -complete (and satisfiability, of course, to be
Σ p2 -complete).
2. Preliminaries
We will begin with a formal definition of LP and statements of some previous results. Except as noted, the
definitions and results will be drawn from [2].
2.1. The language
Definition 1. The language of the Logic of Proofs (LP) contains
• the language of classical propositional logic which includes propositional variables, truth constants >, ⊥, and
boolean connectives,
• proof variables x0, . . . , xn, . . . , proof constants a0, . . . , an, . . .,
• function symbols : unary !, binary · and +,
• operator symbol : of the type “proof polynomial: formula”.
Definition 2 (Proof Polynomial). Proof polynomials are defined inductively:
• Proof variables and proof constants are proof polynomials.
• If t1 and t2 are proof polynomials, so are !t1, t1 · t2, and t1 + t2.
In general, r · s · t . . . should be read (. . . ((r · s) · t) . . .) and similarly for r + s + t . Proof polynomials built up
entirely of constants are called ground.
Definition 3 (LP Formula). Formulas are defined just as for propositional logic, with one added inductive case for
the operator:
• Propositional letters, >, and ⊥ are formulas.
• If F1 and F2 are formulas, so are F1 → F2, F1 ∧ F2, F1 ∨ F2, ¬F1.
• If F is a formula and t is a proof polynomial, t : F is a formula.
We will generally use F , G, H for formulas in this language. The intended semantics for t : F is “t is a proof
of F”. This intended semantics is made explicit via an arithmetic provability interpretation in [2] and a Kripke frame
interpretation in [7]. Note that proof systems for t : F are multi-conclusion ones, so t may represent a proof of several
different F’s.
2.2. Syntax
Definition 4 (Axioms and Rules of LP0). We will begin by defining the system LP0 in the language of LP . LP0 has
the following axiom schemes:
A0. a finite set of axiom schemes sufficient for classical propositional logic,
A1. t : F → F reflection,
A2. t : (F → G)→ (s : F → (t · s) : G) application,
A3. t : F →!t : (t : F) proof checker,
A4. s : F → (s + t) : F , t : F → (s + t) : F sum,
and the single rule of inference modus ponens:
F → G F
G
.
The deduction theorem Γ , A ` B ⇐⇒ Γ ` A → B can be proven for LP0 by an easy inductive argument.
While it is necessary (for reasons to be explicated in Section 2.4) to set out a Hilbert-style axiomatization for LP ,
it will often be more convenient for us to use a sequent formulation.
Definition 5. By a sequent we mean a pair Γ =⇒ ∆ where Γ and∆ are finite multisets of LP-formulas. The axioms
of LPG0 are sequents of the form Γ , F =⇒ F,∆ and Γ ,⊥ =⇒ ∆. Along with the usual Gentzen sequent rules of
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classical propositional logic, including the cut and contraction rules (see for example G2c from [17]), LPG0 contains
the rules
A,Γ =⇒ ∆
t : A,Γ =⇒ ∆ (:=⇒)
Γ =⇒ ∆, t : A
Γ =⇒ ∆, !t : t : A (=⇒!)
Γ =⇒ ∆, t : A
Γ =⇒ ∆, (t + s) : A (=⇒ +)
Γ =⇒ ∆, t : A
Γ =⇒ ∆, (s + t) : A (=⇒ +)
Γ =⇒ ∆, s : (A → B) Γ =⇒ ∆, t : A
Γ =⇒ ∆, (s · t) : B (=⇒ ·).
By LPG−0 we will mean the corresponding system without the rule Cut.
It is a theorem from [2] that the following are equivalent:
(1) LPG−0 ` Γ =⇒ ∆,
(2) LPG0 ` Γ =⇒ ∆,
(3) LP0 `∧Γ →∨∆.
This, in conjunction with the deduction theorem, means that the deducibility of the sequent Γ =⇒ ϕ in a cut-
free sequent calculus and the statement Γ ` ϕ about the Hilbert-style LP0 are equivalent. I will often use the latter
notation but rely on the existence of a cut-free sequent proof in arguing that if something was provable, it could only
have been because a particular other formula was provable.
2.3. Semantics
There are several semantics for the language of LP for which the above axiomatization is sound and complete. In
Artemov’s original work [2], the formulas were interpreted as arithmetic sentences with a provably ∆1 predicate
Prf(x, y) (“x represents a proof of the formula encoded by y”) playing a central role. In his paper proving the
decidability of LP [14], Mkrtychev introduced a semantics based on a combination of classical truth assignments
and proof–theorem assignments. This system was adapted by Kuznets [11] when he analyzed the complexity of
the decidability problem, and by Fitting [7], who expanded it to a full Kripke-style semantics for LP. In Fitting’s
framework, Mkrtychev’s models correspond to one-world models.
Mkrtychev’s semantics is the most succinctly stated, and so we will use that in the present paper:
Definition 6 (Models of LP Formulas). Suppose ∗(·) is a function mapping LP proof polynomials to sets of LP
formulas. We will call ∗ a proof–theorem assignment for LP if it satisfies the following conditions:
• if (G → F) ∈ ∗(s) and G ∈ ∗(t) then F ∈ ∗(s · t),
• ∗(s) ∪ ∗(t) ⊆ ∗(s + t).
A proof–theorem assignment is called transitive if in addition F ∈ ∗(t) implies t : F ∈ ∗(!t).
A truth assignment is a mapping v from the set of propositional letters to the set {True,False}. Given a truth
assignment v and a proof–theorem assignment ∗, we define an interpretation I of the language of LP to be a triple
(v, ∗,) where  is a truth relation on formulas:
• for any propositional variable P ,  P if and only if v(P) = True,
•  t : F if and only if F ∈ ∗(t),
•  is defined inductively for boolean connectives in the usual manner.
We write I  F to denote that  F holds for interpretation I. An interpretation I is called reflexive if F ∈ ∗(t)
implies I  F for any formula F and any proof polynomial t .
The system LP0 enjoys soundness and completeness with respect to reflexive and transitive interpretations in this
semantics:
Theorem 7. LP0 ` F if and only if I  F for all reflexive and transitive interpretations I of the language of LP .
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2.4. Proof constants
We turn now to proof constants, mentioned in the definition of the language of LP and not since. It turns out that
the rules and semantics of proof constants, while simple, are “surprisingly central” [7]. Continuing to quote Fitting,
“proof constants are intended to represent evidence for elementary truths — those truths we know for reasons we do
not further analyze”. In our context, proof constants will represent the proofs of axioms. We will define several flavors
of constant specification and will associate these with both the syntax and the semantics of LP .
Definition 8. A constant specification is a mapping C from the set of proof constants to sets of formulas (possibly
empty). A formula X has a proof constant with respect to C if X ∈ C(c) for some proof constant c. It is required that
any formula having a proof constant with respect to C must be valid in LP0.
A constant specification C is called:
• Axiomatically appropriate if the range of C is exactly the instances of axiom schemes A0–A4.
• Injective if C associates each proof constant with either a single formula or no formulas at all.
• Schematic if each proof constant c is associated with some number (possibly zero) of axiom schemes from A0 to
A4 and C(c) consists of exactly the instances of those schemes.
• Schematically injective if C is schematic and no constant corresponds to more than one axiom scheme.
• Maximal if each constant is associated with all instances of all axiom schemes A0–A4. Note that the maximal
specification is both axiomatically appropriate and schematic.
• Finite if C(c) = ∅ for all but a finite number of proof constants c and furthermore C(c) is a finite set of specific
formulas for each proof constant c.
A note on the terminology: In Artemov’s original formulation of LP [2], “constant specification” referred to
what was defined above as a finite constant specification. The particular definitions of “constant specification” and
“axiomatically appropriate” just cited are Fitting’s from [7]. The term “maximal constant specification” is from
Kuznets [11]. The use of the term “schematic” is new in the present paper, but the idea is present in both [6]
and [11]. The notion of a “schematically injective” constant specification is new. Note that “injective” means “one
formula per constant” whereas “schematically injective” means “one axiom scheme per constant”, with the result that
schematically injective constant specifications are not injective.
Let us now incorporate constant specifications into the syntax and semantics of LP .
The syntactic rule of necessitation from classical modal logic (from F infer F) is replaced in its explicit
counterparts by necessitation on axioms, with the  operator made explicit by proof constants.
Definition 9 (C Axiom Necessitation). Let C be a constant specification. Then the rule of C Axiom Necessitation is
the rule
c : A where A is an instance of an LP axiom A0–A4 and A ∈ C(c).
If we add the rule of C Axiom Necessitation to LP0 (whose only rule of inference, recall, is modus ponens) we
get LPC . Thus, LP0 is LPE where E is the constant specification with E(c) = ∅ for all proof constants c. We will
denote deduction in LPC by `C .
What Artemov [1–3], Mkrtychev [14], and Kuznets [11] refer to simply as LP would be LPM under the present
terminology, whereM is the maximal constant specification defined above.
We can also add C Axiom Necessitation to the sequent calculi LPG0 and LPG−0 by adding the sequent rule
Γ =⇒ A,∆
Γ =⇒ c : A,∆ (=⇒ c)
where A is an instance of an LP axiom A0–A4 and A ∈ C(c). The equivalences of LPC , LPGC , and LPG−C continue
to hold.
To incorporate constant specifications into the semantics is equally straightforward.
Definition 10 (C Model). A reflexive and transitive interpretation I of the language of LP is called a C-model if
I  c : F for proof constant c and formula F whenever F ∈ C(c).
All of the previously cited results for LP0 carry over to LPC (with reasonable restrictions on the C’s involved).
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Theorem 11. Let C be a constant specification.
• The Deduction Theorem holds for LPC .
• Assuming C is axiomatically appropriate, LPC is sound and complete for C-models.
• Assuming C is both axiomatically appropriate and schematic, LPC is decidable.
Finally, one more lemma from [2] which will see much use in the present work:
Lemma 12 (Lifting Lemma). Let C be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification. If Es : Γ ,∆ `C F, then
there is a proof polynomial t (Ex, Ey) such that Es : Γ , Ey : ∆ `C t (Es, Ey) : F.
2.5. Subsystems of LP
Just as LP is an explicit version of the modal logic S4, there are systems closely related to LP which realize some
well-known subsystems of S4: K, T, and K4.1 These explicit versions of sublogics of S4 were defined, axiomatized,
and proved sufficient to realize proofs in the corresponding modal logics by Brezhnev in [6] and were provided with a
Mkrtychev-style semantics by Kuznets [11]. Of particular interest is LP(K4), also called the Logic of Beliefs, but we
will treat K and T also.
Most definitions and results carry through for explicit versions of K, T, and K4. Leaving aside the matter of constant
specifications for the moment, let us define the explicit versions of these logics.
Definition 13. We continue to work in the language of LP . Let the axiom schemes A0–A4 and modus ponens be as
in Definition 4.
• LP(K)0 is the system consisting of axiom schemes A0, A2, and A4, plus the rule modus ponens.
• LP(T)0 is the system LP(K)0 plus the axiom scheme A1.
• LP(K4)0 is the system LP(K)0 plus the axiom scheme A3.
The sequent versions of these logics can also be obtained by eliminating the rules (:=⇒), yielding LP(K4)0;
(=⇒!), yielding LP(T)0; or both of the just-mentioned rules, yielding LP(K)0.
For LP(K4), the definitions of constant specification and C-model carry through unchanged, simply dropping
references to axiom scheme A1. For LP(K) and LP(T), we require something more:
Definition 14. A constant specification C is strongly LP appropriate if X ∈ C(c) if and only if one of the following
two conditions is met:
• X is an instance of an axiom scheme,
• X is d : Y where d is a proof constant and Y ∈ C(d).
In LP(K) and LP(T), we replace “axiomatically appropriate” with “strongly LP appropriate” where needed, and
replace C axiom necessitation with the following recursive variant:
C-Axiom Necessitation for LP(K) and LP(T):
c : A where A ∈ C(c) and either A is an instance of an axiom or
A can be inferred using C-Axiom Necessitation.
3. Complexity
In [11], Kuznets showed that the problem of derivability in LP is inΠ p2 , at the second level of the polynomial-time
hierarchy. (See [15] or any standard text on complexity theory for definitions and background.) Kuznets was working
in LPM, whereM is the maximal constant specification, but his proof does not rely on the maximality of the constant
specification.
1 A very small amount of background: In addition to propositional axiom schemes, modus ponens, and necessitation, S4 has the three axiom
schemes corresponding to application ((A → B)→ (A → B)), reflection (A → A), and proof checker (A → A). The modal logic
K has only application, T has application and reflection, and K4 has application and proof checker. For much more information see [10].
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Theorem 15 ([11]). Given a schematic constant specification C and a formula F in the language of LP , the problem
of deciding whether `C F is in Π p2 .
Proof. The following is only a very rough outline: Kuznets worked on the dual problem, showing that satisfiability is
in Σ p2 . He took a semantic approach and worked with sequents Γ ⇒ ∆made up of both formulae and proof–theorem
assignment requirements of the form F ∈ ∗(t).
A sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is reflexively saturated if the following four conditions are met:
(1) If A → B ∈ Γ then either A ∈ ∆ or B ∈ Γ .
(2) If A → B ∈ ∆ then A ∈ Γ and B ∈ ∆.
(3) If (t : A) ∈ Γ then A ∈ Γ and A ∈ ∗(t).
(4) If (t : A) ∈ ∆ then either A ∈ ∆ or A ∈ ∗(t) ∈ ∆.
Kuznets’s saturation algorithm starts with a sequent and non-deterministically finds a saturated sequent which is
falsifiable exactly if the original sequent was. The algorithm operates in NP time.
The next step is to turn a sequent consisting of formulae and proof–theorem assignment requirements into a
C-model. The challenging part of this is not the propositional valuation, but extending the set of proof–theorem
assignment requirements into a proof–theorem assignment. Kuznets has an algorithm for this, and by a clever use of
the Robinson graph algorithm shows that the problem of realizing whether a given sequent containing only atomic
formulae and proof–theorem assignment requirements is refutable is a co-NP problem.
The saturation and completion problems taken together show that satisfiability for LPC is in Σ p2 . 
Kuznets [11] also showed that derivability for the explicit versions of K, T, and K4 is in Π p2 .
We will show that the problem of derivability in LP(K4) is Π p2 -hard for any schematic, axiomatically appropriate
constant specification, and that derivability is Π p2 -hard in full LP under any schematically injective, axiomatically
appropriate constant specification.
In both proofs, the following technical lemma about proof polynomials for a particular form of propositional
tautology will be useful. Note that the argument goes through for both LP and LP(K4).
Lemma 16. Let a propositional formula ψ in 3-CNF2 built up out of propositional variables p1, . . . , pn and an
axiomatically appropriate constant specification C be given. There is a single ground proof polynomial gψ such that
`C gψ : ( pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → ψ) for all assignments of the pˆi to either pi or ¬pi which make pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → ψ
a tautology. Furthermore, if C is schematic, then gψ is of size O(n · |ψ |), where |ψ | is the total number of appearances
of propositional variables and connectives in ψ .
Of course, this presumes a relatively standard axiomatization of propositional logic. One might dream up an
axiomatization of propositional logic which would expand the size of gψ , but it would remain polynomial in the
length of ψ , which is all that matters to us for the present. (See [16] for conservation of the lengths of proofs under
different axiomatizations.)
The portion of the lemma that will be of use to us, and the only portion that is at all surprising, is that we can lift
the proofs corresponding to the various valuations which make ψ true into the same proof polynomial in each case if
the constant specification C is schematic. If we had an injective constant specification instead, for example, the length
of gψ would be exponentially long in the length of ψ .
Let us now work through the details of building gψ .
Proof. Let a formula ψ with m 3-clauses C1, . . . ,Cm built up out of propositional variables p1, . . . , pn be given. We
wish to show that there is a single ground proof term gψ of size O(n · m) such that for any assignment of the pˆi ’s to
pi or ¬pi such that pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → ψ , gψ : ( pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → ψ). (Note that 6m − 1 ≤ |ψ | ≤ 9m − 1,
because ψ is in 3-CNF, so size O(n · m) is sufficient to prove the theorem as stated.)
Let us establish our propositional axiom schemes and associate proof constants with them:
(1) a1 : ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ).
2 A formula is in conjunctive normal form (CNF) if it is a conjunction of clauses of the form (L1∨ · · ·∨ Lm ) where each L i is a literal. If m = 3
in each clause, ψ is in 3-CNF.
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(2) a2 : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ (ψ → θ))→ (ϕ→ θ).
(3) a3 : ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ).
(4) a4 : ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ).
(5) a5 : ϕ→ ψ → ϕ ∧ ψ .
We will begin by finding a proof term g j for a single clause C j such that for any assignment of the pˆi ’s to pi or
¬pi such that pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → C j , g j : ( pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → C j ).
To simplify notation, let us assume that the clause C j is (p j1∨¬p j2∨ p j3). Identical arguments and proof constants
would work with different combinations of positives and negatives in front of the three atoms.
Let us note that in any assignment of the pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi such that pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → C j , at least one
of pˆ j1 = p j1 , pˆ j2 = ¬p j2 , and pˆ j3 = p j3 is true. Assume for the moment that we could come up with proof
constants g j1 , g j2 and g j3 such that for any assignment of the pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi such that if pˆ j1 = p j1 then
g j1 : ( pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → C j ) (and similarly for g j2 and g j3 ). Under this assumption, the g j we are looking
for will be (g j1 + g j2 + g j3).
While it is not always trivial to find an explicit proof of clearly valid propositional formulas, the task is made much
simpler if an outline is given which lists the order in which the axiom schemes and the rule modus ponens are to be
invoked without explicating the particular instances of the schemes. This is, in effect, what explicit proof terms do
under a schematically injective constant specification.
We will attempt to balance explicitness with succinctness by presenting explicit proof terms which encode proofs
of various valid schemes under the above axiomatization/constant specification, but relegating the proofs themselves
to an Appendix.
With this understanding, a few facts:
• ((a2 · a3) · (a1 · a3)) : p j1 → (p j1 ∨ ¬p j2 ∨ p j3).
• ((a2 · a4) · (a1 · a3)) : ¬p j2 → (p j1 ∨ ¬p j2 ∨ p j3).
• a3 : p j3 → (p j1 ∨ ¬p j2 ∨ p j3).
• If x : ϕ→ θ , then ((a2 · x) · (a1 · a1)) : ϕ→ ψ → θ for any ψ .
• If x : ϕ→ θ , then (a1 · x) : ψ → ϕ→ θ for any ψ .
By beginning the first of these facts and then applying the last-but-one formula n− j1 times (with ψ = pˆi for each
i > j1) and finishing with j1 − 1 applications of the final formula (with ψ = pˆi for each i < j1), we generate exactly
the desired g j1 as described above.
Note that g j1 is independent of the assignments of the pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi . (It doesn’t even matter whether our root
was p j1 or ¬p j1 . The proof outline as encoded in the proof term will be identical.) Note also that the length of g j1 is
exactly 4+ 3(n − j1)+ ( j1 − 1) ≤ 3n + 1.
Exactly parallel constructions beginning with the second and third facts generate g j2 and g j3 , each of which is also
independent of the particular assignment of the pˆi ’s and which have length at most 3n + 1 and 3n − 2 respectively.
Thus, g j has length at most 9n.
We now have m proof terms g j each of size linear in n such that g j : ( pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → C j ) is valid for all
assignments of the pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi such that pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → C j .
Before we proceed, a last fact, this one involving a particularly ugly proof polynomial:
• If x : (θ1 → (θ2 → ψ)) then (a2 · [a2 · [a1 · (a1 · x)] · a2] · (a1 · [a2 · (a1 · a2) · (a2 · a1 · (a1 · a2))])) : (ϕ→ θ1)→
[(ϕ→ θ2)→ (ϕ→ ψ)].
Let ϕˆ1, . . . , ϕˆn be, as usual, some assignment such that ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → ψ . Apply the above fact n times to the
formula a5 : C1 → C2 → (C1 ∧ C2), with ϕ as ϕˆn , then as ˆϕn−1, etc., to obtain a ground proof polynomial of length
13n + 1, call it b2. We see that
b2 : (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → C1)→ (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → C2)
→ (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → (C1 ∧ C2)).
Now the proof polynomial
(b2 · g1 · g2) : (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → (C1 ∧ C2)).
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Call this proof polynomial d2 and note that its length is at most ((13n + 1)+ 9n + 9n).
We can repeat the above process beginning with the formula a5 : (C1 ∧ C2)→ C3 → (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3) to obtain
b3 : (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → (C1 ∧ C2))→ (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → C3)
→ (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3)).
Again, b3 has length 13n + 1. We define d3 as b3 · d2 · g3 and note that
d3 : (ϕˆ1 → · · · → ϕˆn → (C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3)).
Proceeding similarly, we see that dm will be the desired gψ and will have length at most 9n+ (m−1) · (22n+1) <
22nm, clearly in the promised O(n · m) complexity class. 
The following is an immediate consequence of reflection (axiom A1) in LP , but requires a simple inductive proof
in LP(K4):
Proposition 17. Let C be any constant specification and g be a ground proof polynomial. If `C g : F then `C F.
Finally, a fact that is immediate from the soundness and definitions of semantics for both LP and LP(K4):
Proposition 18. For any constant specification C, if `C F for a purely propositional formula F, then F is a
propositional tautology.
Note that the above two propositions tell us that if `C g : F for a ground proof term g and a purely propositional
formula F , then F must be a tautology. In particular, if `C gψ : ( pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → ψ) then pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → ψ
is a tautology.
3.1. The Logic of Beliefs
We will show that deducibility in the Logic of Beliefs (explicit K4) is Π p2 -hard by encoding an arbitrary∀∃-quantified boolean formula into the language of LP so that it is valid exactly if LP(K4) proves it. This case
is much simpler than that of the full LP and serves as a good introduction to the ideas involved.
Theorem 19. Given a quantified boolean formula ϕ = ∀p1 · · · ∀pn∃q1 · · · ∃qmψ with m, n ≥ 0 and ψ a quantifier-
free 3-CNF boolean combination of p1, . . . , pn , q1, . . . , qm , and given any axiomatically appropriate and schematic
constant specification C there is a formula F in the language of LP such that `C F in LP(K4) exactly if ϕ is valid.
Proof. Let ϕ be as in the statement of the theorem. Let C be any schematic, axiomatically appropriate constant
specification.
Let gψ be as in Lemma 16 (noting that we now have propositional atoms p1, . . . , pn and q1, . . . , qm) and let F be
the following:
[(x1 : p1 ∨ x1 : ¬p1) ∧ · · · ∧ (xn : pn ∨ xn : ¬pn)
∧ (y1 : q1) ∧ (z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm) ∧ (zm : ¬qm)]
→ (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ.
By the deduction theorem, we can say that LP(K4) proves F if and only if
(x1 : p1 ∨ x1 : ¬p1), . . . , (xn : pn ∨ xn : ¬pn),
(y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ.
Let pˆi be either pi or ¬pi . Because propositional connectives are handled in both the syntax and semantics in a
purely classical manner, the above will hold exactly if for each possible assignment of the pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi :
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ.
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As the conclusion of this deduction is, propositionally speaking, an atom, the only rules which might have been used
in the last step of a sequent deduction were the LP rules (=⇒ +), (=⇒ ·), and (=⇒!). Since the proof polynomial
involved is a product, the rule must have been (=⇒ ·). This means that there must be some formula H so that both
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C (ym + zm) : H
and
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym−1 + zm−1) : H → ψ.
Let us concentrate on the former first. If our premises prove (ym + zm) : H , the last rule used must have been
(=⇒ +), and we must have a deduction either
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm) `C ym : H
or
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm) `C zm : H.
Clearly H is either qm or ¬qm . Whichever one holds, call it qˆm .
Now we know that
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym−1 + zm−1)) : qˆm → ψ.
Proceed similarly to show that
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn) : qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ
for some assignment of the qˆ j ’s to either q j or ¬q j .
Once again, the last rule used in such a deduction must have been (=⇒ ·), so there must be a formula H such that
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm) `C xn : H
and
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C (gψ · x1 · . . . · xn−1) : H → qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ.
Clearly, H must be pˆn .
Again, we proceed similarly and show that if the original F was deducible, then for each assignment of the pˆi ’s to
either pi or ¬pi , we know that
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm)
`C gψ : ( pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · qˆm → ψ)
for some assignment of the qˆ j ’s to either q j or ¬q j .
However, as the premises make no reference to any proof constants, this will only be so if `C gψ : pˆ1 → · · · →
pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · qˆm → ψ . (This is not immediate, but follows from a disassembly of gψ into its constituent proof
constants and the fact that for proof constant c
(x1 : pˆ1), . . . , (xn : pˆn), (y1 : q1), (z1 : ¬q1), . . . , (ym : qm), (zm : ¬qm) `C c : A
for a purely propositional formula A only if A is an instance of a propositional axiom scheme corresponding to c.)
It follows that for each assignment of the pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi there is an assignment of the qˆ j ’s to q j or ¬q j which
makes pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · qˆm → ψ a tautology, and ϕ is valid.
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We have really tackled only one direction the proof. We have shown that if F was deducible, then ϕ was valid.
However, the proof in the other direction is much more straightforward. If ϕ is valid, then given any assignment of the
pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi there is an assignment of the qˆ j ’s to q j or ¬q j so that pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · qˆm → ψ is
a propositional tautology. Going from this fact to a deduction of F is simple and straightforward, given the gψ from
Lemma 16. 
Corollary 20. The deducibility problem isΠ p2 -complete for LP(K4) under any schematic, axiomatically appropriate
constant specification. The dual problem of satisfiability is Σ p2 -complete.
A close examination of the above proof will show that it goes through for LP(K) as well, as long as the constant
specification is strongly LP appropriate.
3.2. The full logic of proofs
For those familiar with the Logic of Proofs or with modal logic generally, the impossibility of using the above proof
in a system with reflection (the axiom (t : F) → F) will be clear. We had as premises both y : q and z : ¬q, and
these together with reflection axioms prove anything. Our task in bringing the above proof to the full logic of proofs
will be to insist not only that a certain formula be provable, but that it be provable without reflection. To do that, we
will capture the proof we want as a proof polynomial, but we will need to be able to distinguish within that proof
polynomial which axioms each constant refers to. Thus, we will specify a constant specification in which different
axioms are associated with different constants, and prove that we can encode our quantified boolean formula under
that constant specification.
Theorem 21. Given a quantified boolean formula ϕ = ∀p1 · · · ∀pn∃q1 · · · ∃qmψ with m, n ≥ 0 and ψ a quantifier-
free 3-CNF boolean combination of p1, . . . , pn , q1, . . . , qm and an axiomatically appropriate schematically injective
constant specification C, one can find a formula F in the language of LP such that `C F exactly if ϕ is valid.
Proof. Let ϕ be as in the statement of the theorem. Let C be a schematically injective axiomatically appropriate
constant specification. We will select three proof constants c2, cL , and cR3 such that:
• c2 : A exactly if A is an instance of application (axiom scheme A2).
• cL : A exactly if A is an instance of the left sum rule for proof polynomials.
• cR : A exactly if A is an instance of the right sum rule for proof polynomials.
The formula F will be quite long, so let us introduce one abbreviation, once again making use of the gψ from
Lemma 16:
We will define the proof polynomial kn built out of proof constants and the variables x1, . . . , xn by induction. Let
k0 =!gψ , and let ki = c2 · ki−1· !xi .
Let us note some facts about kn . Since gψ had length quadratic in the length of ψ , so will kn . We know that if
pˆ1 → pˆ2 → · · · pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · qˆm → ψ is valid, then
`C gψ : pˆ1 → pˆ2 → · · · pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · qˆm → ψ
and that
x1 : pˆ1, x2 : pˆ2, . . . , xn : pˆn `C gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn : qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ.
By Lemma 12, we are guaranteed a proof polynomial k so that
x1 : pˆ1, x2 : pˆ2, . . . , xn : pˆn `C k : (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn : qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ).
This k which is guaranteed is, in fact, the kn defined above. Furthermore, under the constant specification C, it turns
out that kn uniquely identifies this proof, to the extent that if x1 : pˆ1, . . . , xn : pˆn `C kn : H for some formula H ,
then H must be of the form gψ · x1 · . . . xn : G, with `C gψ : pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → G.
Let us prove this assertion by induction. We will abbreviate x1 : pˆ1, x2 : pˆ2, . . . xn : pˆn by Γn .
3 Note that c2, cL , and cR themselves are not necessarily symbols from the language of LP . I am using them to stand in for three proof constants
from the domain of C which we know to exist because C is axiomatically appropriate and schematically injective.
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Lemma 22. For i ≤ n, Γn `C ki : H if and only if H is of the form gψ · x1 · . . . · xi : G and Γn `C gψ : pˆ1 → pˆ2 →
· · · pˆi → G.
Proof. In the case i = 0, the assertion simply states that Γn `C !gψ : H if and only if H is of the form gψ : G and
Γn `C gψ : G. Given that from our particular Γn no propositional rule or use of the rule (:=⇒) could have yielded
!gψ : H , it must have resulted from use of the rule (=⇒!), and the conclusion follows.
Now let us assume that the assertion holds for i and prove it for i + 1. Γn `C c2 · ki ·!xi+1 : H . Again, there
is no propositional rule or use of the rule (:=⇒) which could yield this result, given our particular Γn , so it must
have been a result of the rule (=⇒ ·). That means that there must have been a formula F so that Γn `C !xi+1 : F
and Γn `C c2 · ki : F → H . Clearly !xi+1 is the result of an application of (=⇒!) to a formula of the form
xi+1 : F ′ with Γn `C xi+1 : F ′. An examination of Γn shows us that F ′ could only be ˆpi+1. So it must be
that Γn `C c2 · ki : (xi+1 : ˆpi+1) → H . Again, this could not have resulted from any propositional rules
or use of (:=⇒) and must be a result of (=⇒ ·). There must be a formula Hi so that Γn `C ki : Hi and
Γn `C c2 : Hi → (xi+1 : ˆpi+1 → H). By induction, we know Hi to be of the form gψ · x1 · . . . · xi : G and that
Γn `C gψ : pˆ1 → pˆ2 → · · · pˆi → G. Thus, we know that Γn `C c2 : (gψ · x1 · . . . · xi : G)→ (xi+1 : ˆpi+1 → H).
This must mean that (gψ · x1 · . . . · xi : G)→ (xi+1 : ˆpi+1 → H) is an instance of axiom scheme A2, and G must
have been of the form ˆpi+1 → G ′ with H of the form x1 · . . . · xi · xi+1 : G ′. Furthermore, since we know that
Γn `C gψ : pˆ1 → pˆ2 → · · · pˆi → G, we know that Γn `C gψ : pˆ1 → pˆ2 → · · · pˆi → ˆpi+1 → G ′ because G is
exactly ˆpi+1 → G ′. This completes the inductive argument about kn . 
Clearly, for any assignment of pˆi ’s which has a corresponding set of qˆ j ’s which make ψ true,
x1 : pˆ1, . . . xn : pˆn `C ((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm ∧ zm : ¬qm))
→ (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ.
Moreover, this can be proved in a variety of ways. One way would be to make use of reflection and the premises
y1 : q1 and z1 : ¬q1. However, from our work with the Logic of Beliefs in the previous section, we know that there
is also a proof which uses the premises “as intended” and makes no use of reflection. By applying the Lifting Lemma
we are guaranteed a proof term t (which might refer to the xi ’s) such that
x1 : pˆ1, . . . xn : pˆn `C t : [((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm ∧ zm : ¬qm))
→ (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ].
It turns out that for the “intended” proof, one possible t is of the form
(g0 ·
m times︷ ︸︸ ︷
(cL + cR) · c2 · (cL + cR) · c2 · . . . (cL + cR) · c2) · kn
where g0 is a ground term consisting only of constants corresponding to propositional axioms and kn is the proof
polynomial discussed a few paragraphs ago. It is somewhat surprising that we can engineer g0 to be both quadratic in
the size of ψ and independent of the particular assignment of the qˆ j ’s. This is tedious but not difficult to show, very
much along the lines of Lemma 16.4 Let us denote the full t by tψ . Again, the length of tψ is quadratic in the length
of ψ .
Let F be the following:
[(x1 : p1 ∨ x1 : ¬p1) ∧ · · · ∧ (xn : pn ∨ xn : ¬pn)]
→ tψ : [((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm ∧ zm : ¬qm))
→ (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ].
4 This is the place that the grouping into pairs of (y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm ∧ zm : ¬qm ) comes into play. If we were to let
a6 : ϕ∧ψ → ϕ and a7 : ϕ∧ψ → ψ , it turns out that (a6+a7) : (y1 : q1∧ z1 : ¬q1)→ y1 : q1 and (a6+a7) : (y1 : q1∧ z1 : ¬q1)→ z1 : ¬q1,
so the left/right or positive/negative choices made later in the argument do not affect the construction of g0.
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First of all, let us invoke the deduction theorem and similar arguments to those in the case of LP(K4) to note that
`C F if and only if for each possible assignment of the pˆi ’s to pi or ¬pi
x1 : pˆ1, . . . , xn : pˆn `C tψ : [((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm ∧ zm : ¬qm))
→ (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ].
This observation alone takes care of the universal quantifiers in the original quantified boolean formula
∀p1 · · · ∀pn∃q1 · · · ∃qmψ . As before, let use abbreviate x1 : pˆ1, . . . , xn : pˆn by Γn .
Now all we need to do is show that
Γn `C tψ : [((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm ∧ zm : ¬qm))
→ (gψ · x1 · x2 · . . . · xn · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ]
if and only if ψ with the pi ’s replaced by truth values determined by whether pˆi is pi or ¬pi is satisfiable.
The following lemma will get us much of the way there:
Lemma 23. Let C, c2, cL , cR , tψ and kn be as defined above, and let t be some proof polynomial. Then
Γn `C tψ : [((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ym : qm ∧ zm : ¬qm))
→ (t · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2) · . . . · (ym + zm)) : ψ]
if and only if
Γn `C kn : t : (qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ)
for some assignment of the qˆ j ’s to either q j or ¬q j respectively.
Proof. This is the messiest part of the argument, and for the sake of simplicity and readability, we will restrict
ourselves to the case m = 2. This approach generalizes quite naturally.
Thus, we wish to prove that
Γn `C (g0 · (cL + cR) · c2 · (cL + cR) · c2) · kn :
[((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ (y2 : q2 ∧ z2 : ¬q2))→ (t · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2)) : ψ]
implies Γn `C kn : t : (qˆ2 → qˆ1 → ψ) where qˆ1 is either q1 or ¬q1 and qˆ2 is either q2 or ¬q2. (The implication
in the other direction is much more straightforward and will be easy to reconstruct from the argument in the present
direction.)
We begin with
Γn `C (g0 · (cL + cR) · c2 · (cL + cR) · c2) · kn :
[((y1 : q1 ∧ z1 : ¬q1) ∧ (y2 : q2 ∧ z2 : ¬q2))→ (t · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2)) : ψ].
As the conclusion of this sequent is atomic as far as propositional logic is concerned and no application of (:=⇒)
would have been of any use, the final rule used to obtain this sequent must have been (=⇒ ·). Thus there must be a
formula Fn with
Γn `C kn : Fn
and
Γn `C (g0 · (cL + cR) · c2 · (cL + cR) · c2) :
(Fn → [((y1 : q1∧z1 : ¬q1)∧(y2 : q2∧z2 : ¬q2))→ (t ·(y1+z1)·(y2+z2) : ψ)]).
Let us leave Γn `C kn : Fn alone for the moment and concentrate on the latter formula. Again, it must have been
proven using (=⇒ ·). Thus, there is a formula A1 such that
Γn `C c2 : A1
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and
Γn `C g0 · (cL + cR) · c2 · (cL + cR) :
(A1 → Fn → [((y1 : q1∧z1 : ¬q1)∧(y2 : q2∧z2 : ¬q2))→ (t ·(y1+z1)·(y2+z2) : ψ)]).
Again, the last step in a proof of the latter formula must have used (=⇒ ·), so there is formula A2 so that
Γn `C (cL + cR) : A2
and
Γn `C g0 · (cL + cR) · c2 : (A2 → A1 → Fn
→ [((y1 : q1∧ z1 : ¬q1)∧ (y2 : q2∧ z2 : ¬q2))→ (t · (y1+ z1) · (y2+ z2) : ψ)]).
If we continue in this way twice more, we see that there must also be formulas A3 and A4 so that
Γn `C c2 : A3,
Γn `C (cL + cR) : A4,
and
Γ `C g0 : (A4 → A3 → A2 → A1 → Fn
→ [((y1 : q1∧ z1 : ¬q1)∧ (y2 : q2∧ z2 : ¬q2))→ (t · (y1+ z1) · (y2+ z2) : ψ)]).
Now since Γn `C c2 : A1 and Γn `C c2 : A3, it must be that both A1 and A3 are instances of axiom scheme A2,
the Application rule. Thus, each has the form t : (F → G) → (s : F → (t · s) : G). It is also clear that, since
Γn `C (cL + cR) : A2 and Γn `C (cL + cR) : A4, each of A2 and A4 must be instances of axiom scheme A4, the
Sum rule, either the left or right version. This leads us to four possibilities, based on two choices of cL versus cR . (In
general, of course, we would have 2m possibilities, but we are looking specifically at the case m = 2.) For now, let us
assume that A2 is of the form u : H → (u + v) : H and that A4 is of the form v : H → (u + v) : H . Each of the
other three cases would be dealt with essentially identically to this one.
Note that at least one of these four (in general, 2m) cases must hold, but we have no way of knowing which. This
collection of left/right decisions will correspond to the true/false decisions of the existentially quantified q j ’s from our
original quantified boolean formula.
Now that we know the form A1, A2, A3, and A4 must take, we can restate what we know. It must be that
Γn `C kn : Fn and that
Γn `C g0 : ((v2 : H2 → (u2 + v2) : H2)
→ (t2 : (F2 → G2)→ (s2 : F2)→ (t2 · s2) : G2)
→ (u1 : H1 → (u1 + v1) : H1)
→ (t1 : (F1 → G1)→ (s1 : F1)→ (t1 · s1) : G1)→ Fn
→ [((y1 : q1∧ z1 : ¬q1)∧ (y2 : q2∧ z2 : ¬q2))→ (t · (y1+ z1) · (y2+ z2) : ψ)])
for some formulas F1, G1, F2, G2, H1, H2, and Fn and some proof polynomials s1, t1, s2, t2, u1, u2, v1, and v2.
Further, since it is of the form Γn `C g0 : . . . , it must be that the formula with the g0 stripped off is a propositional
tautology. (Recall that g0 consists entirely of proof constants corresponding to propositional axioms.) However, as
written, it contains many provisional formula and polynomial variables.
Upon close examination, we see that the formula could be rewritten as a conjunction of the following premises:
• y1 : q1,
• z1 : ¬q1,
• y2 : q2,
• z2 : ¬q2,
• t1 : (F1 → G1)→ (s1 : F1)→ (t1 · s1) : G1,
• u1 : H1 → (u1 + v1) : H1,
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• t2 : (F2 → G2)→ (s2 : F2)→ (t2 · s2) : G2,
• v2 : H2 → (u2 + v2) : H2,
• Fn ,
implying the conclusion (t · (y1 + z1) · (y2 + z2)) : ψ . The task that now faces us is a PROLOG-style unification
problem. We need to unify these provisional formula and proof polynomial variables (the F’s, G’s, H ’s, s’s, t’s, u’s,
and v’s) in such a way that the desired conclusion follows tautologically from them. Note here that the y’s, z’s, and
q’s are elementary and may not be unified out. Note as well that we have two pairs of essentially identical schemes.
The choice of which to use at a particular point in unification is arbitrary and will not affect the outcome. (In fact, the
choices might be dictated by the precise form of g0, but that does not affect the current argument.)
One further thing to note is that from what we know about Fn , namely that Γn `C kn : Fn (recall Lemma 22),
we can not unify Fn with any of the first four premises nor with the desired conclusion at any stage of the unification
before the final one. (Otherwise, the unification would be trivial.) This is the only place in the proof of this lemma that
the premises Γn come into play.
We begin with our conclusion: (t · (y1+ z1) · (y2+ z2) : ψ). This must be the consequence of one of our premises,
and the only one that fits the bill is t1 : (F1 → G1)→ (s1 : F1)→ (t1 · s1) : G1 (or its identical twin scheme). Thus,
we will unify t1 with (t · (y1 + z1)), s1 with (y2 + z2), and G1 with ψ .
We now wish to prove (t · (y1 + z1) : (F1 → ψ)) and (y2 + z2) : F1 from
• y1 : q1,
• z1 : ¬q1,
• y2 : q2,
• z2 : ¬q2,
• u1 : H1 → (u1 + v1) : H1,
• t2 : (F2 → G2)→ (s2 : F2)→ (t2 · s2) : G2,
• v2 : H2 → (u2 + v2) : H2,
• Fn .
To prove (y2 + z2) : F1, we will have to unify F1 either with H1 or H2 (this involves a left/right decision). Let us
choose H2 to keep our subscripts straight. This also unifies u2 with y2 and v2 with z2. We also pick up the subgoal of
proving z2 : H2. This clearly identifies H2 (and hence F1) with¬q2. Our new goal is to prove (t ·(y1+z1)) : ¬q2 → ψ
propositionally from:
• y1 : q1,
• z1 : ¬q1,
• y2 : q2,
• u1 : H1 → (u1 + v1) : H1,
• t2 : (F2 → G2)→ (s2 : F2)→ (t2 · s2) : G2,
• Fn .
This step and the next are very similar to the previous two. We unify t with t2, (y1 + z1) with s2, and G2 with
¬q2 → ψ . This creates the subgoal of proving (y1 + z1) : F2. This can only be achieved by unifying u1 with y1, v1
with z1, and F2 with H1. Again, we create the subgoal of proving y1 : H1, which clearly unifies H1 (and F2) with q1.
Finally, we are left having to prove t : q1 → (¬q2)→ ψ propositionally from
• z1 : ¬q1,
• y2 : q2,
• Fn .
Clearly the only way to do this is to unify Fn with t : q1 → (¬q2)→ ψ , and at this point, we are free to do this
(assuming the t is suitable). Remember that the only criterion we had for Fn was that Γn `C kn : Fn , so we have
shown that, given the left/right choices we made Γn `C kn : t : ¬q2 → q1 → ψ . What we have shown in general is
that for some assignment of qˆ1 to q1 or ¬q1 and qˆ2 to q2 or ¬q2, Γ `C kn : t : qˆ2 → qˆ1 → ψ .
This is exactly what we wished to show, at least for the case m = 2. The way to generalize this is clear. This
completes the proof of the lemma. 
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Now let the assignments of pˆi to pi and ¬pi be arbitrary and the assignments of qˆ j to q j and ¬q j be those
guaranteed by the above lemma in the context of the given pˆi ’s. Under these circumstances, we have reduced our task
to showing that
x1 : pˆ1, . . . , xn : pˆn `C kn : (gψ · x1 · . . . · xn) : qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ
if and only if ψ is true under the valuation of the pi ’s and q j ’s specified by the choices of pˆi and qˆ j .
By Lemma 22,
x1 : pˆ1, . . . , xn : pˆn `C kn : (gψ · x1 · . . . · xn) : qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ
if and only if
`C gψ : pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ.
This is true only if
pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ
is a tautology.
Thus, our task has finally been reduced to the trivial: Show that pˆ1 → · · · → pˆn → qˆ1 → · · · → qˆm → ψ is a
tautology if and only if ψ is true under the valuation of the pi ’s and q j ’s specified by the choices of pˆi and qˆ j . Since
the choices of pˆi and qˆ j specify a complete valuation as far as ψ is concerned, we are done. 
Corollary 24. Given a formula F in the language of LP , the problem of whether F can be derived under a
given schematically injective, axiomatically appropriate constant specification is Π p2 -complete. The dual problem
of satisfiability is Σ p2 -complete.
4. Future work
Several issues relating to the complexity of LP remain unanswered. First, does deducibility remain Π p2 -hard if the
condition of schematic injectivity is dropped? In particular, is deducibility under the maximal constant specification
Π p2 -hard? Secondly, what is the computability-theoretic complexity of deduction from an infinite recursive set of
premises? Some further research into the complexity of LP has already been done. It is a folk result following from
[2] and [11] that derivability in LP0 is co-NP complete, and it follows that it is also co-NP complete for finite constant
specifications (and hence for fixed injective constant specifications, as a particular formula mentions only finitely many
constants). Kuznets has also shown that decidable constant specifications can be designed which lead to satisfiability
being undecidable [12].
There are many variations and extensions ofLP not mentioned in the present paper, and of course another direction
for research is to pursue complexity questions for these.
Finally, there are manyΣ p2 -complete andΠ
p
2 -complete problems in other areas of computer science. (For example,
the problems of credulous/skeptical reasoning in default logic fall into this category.) Are there natural translations
between LP and structures in these other areas of study?
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Appendix
As an aid to those who wish to confirm the technical details involved in the proof terms from Lemma 16, here are
some of the deductions alluded to in the proof.
Proposition 25. ϕ→ ψ,ψ → θ ` ϕ→ θ invoking each premise only once and invoking two axioms.
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ψ → θ Premise
(ψ → θ)→ ϕ→ (ψ → θ) Axiom 1
ϕ→ ψ → θ Modus Ponens
ϕ→ ψ Premise
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ → θ)→ (ϕ→ θ) Axiom 2
(ϕ→ ψ → θ)→ (ϕ→ θ) Modus Ponens
ϕ→ θ Modus Ponens
Corollary 26. A → (A ∨ B ∨ C) with four calls to axioms.
Apply Proposition 25 with premises A → (A ∨ B) (Axiom 3) and (A ∨ B)→ (A ∨ B ∨ C) (Axiom 3 again).
Corollary 27. B → (A ∨ B ∨ C) with four calls to axioms.
Apply Proposition 25 with premises B → (A ∨ B) (Axiom 4) and (A ∨ B)→ (A ∨ B ∨ C) (Axiom 3).
Proposition 28. ϕ→ θ ` ϕ→ ψ → θ invoking the premise only once and invoking three axioms.
θ → ψ → θ Axiom 1
(θ → ψ → θ)→ ϕ→ (θ → ψ → θ) Axiom 1
ϕ→ θ → ψ → θ Modus Ponens
[ϕ→ θ ] → [ϕ→ θ → ψ → θ ] → [ϕ→ ψ → θ ] Axiom 2
ϕ→ θ Premise
[ϕ→ θ → ψ → θ ] → [ϕ→ ψ → θ ] Modus Ponens
ϕ→ ψ → θ Modus Ponens
Proposition 29. ϕ→ θ ` ψ → ϕ→ θ invoking the premise only once and invoking one axiom.
ϕ→ θ Premise
(ϕ→ θ)→ ψ → (ϕ→ θ) Axiom 1
ψ → ϕ→ θ Modus Ponens
Proposition 30. A → B → C ` B → A → C invoking the premise only once and invoking 6 axioms.
(A → B)→ (A → B → C)→ (A → C) Axiom 2
[(A → B)→ (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] →
B → [(A → B)→ (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] Axiom 1
B → (A → B)→ (A → B → C)→ (A → C) Modus Ponens
B → (A → B) Axiom 1
[B → (A → B)] →
[B → (A → B)→ (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] →
[B → (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] Axiom 2
[B → (A → B)→ (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] →
[B → (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] Modus Ponens
B → (A → B → C)→ (A → C) Modus Ponens
A → B → C Premise
(A → B → C)→ B → (A → B → C) Axiom 1
B → (A → B → C) Modus Ponens
[B → (A → B → C)] →
[B → (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] →
[B → A → C] Axiom 2
[B → (A → B → C)→ (A → C)] → [B → A → C] Modus Ponens
B → A → C Modus Ponens
Corollary 31. [ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ)] → [(ϕ→ θ2)→ (ϕ→ ψ)] can be proved with seven axiom invocations.
This is Proposition 30 with Axiom 2 as premise.
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Proposition 32. θ1 → θ2 → ψ ` (ϕ → θ1)→ (ϕ → θ2)→ (ϕ → ψ) invoking the premise only once and invoking
13 axioms.
θ1 → (θ2 → ψ) Premise
(θ1 → (θ2 → ψ))→ ϕ→ (θ1 → (θ2 → ψ)) Axiom 1
ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ) Mod. Pon.
(ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ))→ (ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ)) Axiom 1
(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ)) Mod. Pon.
(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ))→ (ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ)) Axiom 2
[(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ))]
→ [(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ))→ (ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ))]
→ [(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ))] Axiom 2
[(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ θ1 → (θ2 → ψ))→ (ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ))]
→ [(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ))] Mod. Pon.
(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ)) Mod. Pon.
[ϕ→ (θ2 → ψ)] → [(ϕ→ θ2)→ (ϕ→ ψ)] Corollary 31
(ϕ→ θ1)→ (ϕ→ θ2)→ (ϕ→ ψ) Proposition 25
Note that the use of Corollary 31 adds seven axiom invocations and the use of Proposition 25 adds two.
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